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This policy brief departs from the idea of studying multina-
tional corporations’ “global wealth chains” (Seabrooke and 
Wigan 2014a, 2014b). This can tell us how companies pro-
tect and create wealth by decentering their corporate forms 
in advantageous jurisdictions. The brief proposes a method 
for studying global wealth chains, despite the data limita-
tions that constrain the field, and applies this method to 
Carlsberg A/S, which is a brewery operating across multiple 
jurisdictions. Tax planning strategies to use jurisdictions’ 
legal and financial advantages can be easily identified. For 
example, MNCs can incorporate in one specific jurisdiction 
to attract institutional investors or raise debt in international 
financial markets through external agents located in specific 
jurisdictions. The focus within global value chain literature 
has been on how MNCs outsource to achieve scale effects 
and secure low input costs of production. This brief argues 
that this only tells half of the story about the modern MNC 
as wealth creation and production, financial plumbing, plays 
an equally important role.  
Data Limitations 
Studies of corporate global wealth chains (GWCs) are cir-
cumscribed by severe data limitations. MNCs are generally 
unwilling to share information about their financial activi-
ties and annual reports contain limited relevant information. 
Annual reports do not typically provide detailed ownership 
information on how parent companies in multinational 
business groups control subsidiaries and, consequently, 
we cannot study how MNCs take advantage of double tax 
treaties between jurisdictions for tax minimization. This 
is controversial as a number of double tax treaties deprive 
developing countries from gains and profits when MNCs 
repatriate wealth. Nor are we able to investigate where the 
MNC generates income on a country-by-country basis, as 
annual reports provide aggregate numbers for the business 
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group. Corporate tax strategies are confidential and valuable 
assets which live off an information asymmetry between the 
MNC and regulators, including third parties like academic 
researchers and journalists. Just like the research and devel-
opment laboratories of MNCs cannot be visited, we cannot 
easily attend the meetings where GWCs are created.
GWC researchers are forced to develop novel research tech-
niques that circumvent these data limitations. Excellent 
examples can be found in the use of experiments to uncover 
how shell companies are sold, and to whom (Sharman 2011; 
Findley et al. 2014). This brief suggests to study GWCs from 
a binary distinction between subsidiaries generating value 
from supply-chain activities and subsidiaries generating and 
protecting wealth by undertaking financial activities. This 
indicates how the MNC has decentered its production, legal 
and financial functions. Through public company registry 
searches we can retrieve information that reveals what kind 
of activities the subsidiary undertakes and how it should be 
categorized. Other pieces of information such as how the 
subsidiary was established, its location and how it is control-
led also helps discovering patterns of a wealth chain.
Differences among jurisdictions in terms of transparency 
and how much data they collect about companies is a further 
challenge to this research method. Around 80 jurisdictions 
worldwide fail to provide a public company registry. In juris-
dictions such as China and Russia a language barrier inhib-
its ‘most’ foreign researchers for using the database. The 
research method therefore primarily applies to jurisdictions 
where company information can be retrieved for free like for 
example Denmark or must be purchased like for example 
Singapore and Hong Kong.
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Carlsberg Subsidiaries in ‘Tax Havens’
By searching for all subsidiaries disclosed in the annual 
report of Carlsberg in public company registries and follow-
ing the ownership information, this study found 165 entities 
affiliated to Carlsberg which are spread across 48 jurisdic-
tions. Subsidiaries are concentrated in Western Europe, 
Eastern Europe and South-East Asia which also are the main 
markets to Carlsberg. However, the study also finds a joint 
venture partner established in the Cayman Islands and a 
minority owner established in the British Virgin Islands. Fur-
ther research is required to clarify how minority owners and 
joint venture partners in low tax jurisdictions like the British 
Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands benefit a MNC.
My research focuses on the subsidiaries of Carlsberg, which 
means the subsidiaries where Carlsberg holds a majority 
of the shares. Further, this research has been demarcated 
to the subsidiaries established in Singapore, Hong Kong, 
Switzerland, Denmark and United Kingdom. The first three 
jurisdictions are well known for providing tax and secrecy 
advantages and are ranked in the top-five of Tax Justice Net-
work’s Financial Secrecy Index (www.financialsecrecyindex.
com), whereas the tax and secrecy advantages in Denmark 
and the United Kingdom are fewer.
Carlsberg controls eleven subsidiaries in Singapore, which is 
a very small market for Carlsberg. Out of eleven subsidiar-
ies, nine subsidiaries undertake financial activities and can 
be categorized as wealth-chain subsidiaries. Taking into 
consideration that MNCs negotiate their tax rate with the 
Singaporean government, Carlsberg has great interest in 
collecting profits in this jurisdiction. Furthermore, Carlsberg 
potentially benefits from an advantageous tax treaty between 
Singapore and India that exempts tax on any capital gains 
arising from sale of Indian shares by a Singaporean parent 
company, as long as the Indian subsidiary has expenditures 
above SGD 200. This is relevant as Carlsberg control their 
Indian operations from Singapore. The tax treaty between 
India and Singapore also makes the round tripping of capi-
tal possible and profitable. This is the circular movement of 
capital and involves sending capital from India to Singapore 
before masquerading it as foreign capital when sending it 
back into India to earn advantages offered to foreign direct 
investment.
Another relatively unimportant jurisdiction to Carlsberg in 
terms of sales is Hong Kong, where they have established four 
subsidiaries. Three of these subsidiaries undertake financial 
activities, which is interesting given that Hong Kong applies a 
source principle of taxation which only taxes income earned 
in Hong Kong by residents. If Carlsberg shifts profits into 
Hong Kong they should therefore be exempted from tax. Hong 
Kong also functions as a hub for round-tripping capital into 
China and Carlsberg’s significant investments in China might 
explain the underlying logic for this structure.
The final typical ‘tax haven’ jurisdiction that has been inves-
tigated in relation to Carlsberg is Switzerland. Switzerland 
is, different from Hong Kong and Singapore, a larger mar-
ket for Carlsberg, where they also control a Swiss brewery. 
Carlsberg has centralized control of their Western-European 
supply-chain in Switzerland due to the central geographical 
position. Out of Carlsberg’s five subsidiaries in Switzerland, 
two subsidiaries undertake financial activities. This includes 
a complex company structure where one subsidiary has been 
established in Hong Kong by a legal consultancy company, 
which later transferred ownership to a Swizz based Carlsberg 
Subsidiary.
By investigating these three jurisdictions, we can peep 
into how Carlsberg disintegrates its financial activities into 
Switzerland, Hong Kong and Singapore. By extending their 
corporate structure into these jurisdictions they get access to 
tax and secrecy advantages and enhance the conditions for 
wealth creation and protection.
Carlsberg in Denmark and the United Kingdom
Turning towards Carlsberg’s engagement in Denmark and 
United Kingdom these are both significant jurisdictions in 
the history of Carlsberg. Carlsberg started out in Denmark 
and is listed at the Danish stock exchange. The United King-
dom became the first export market for Carlsberg in 1868.
During my investigation of wealth chain subsidiaries, 
Carlsberg Breweries located in Denmark attracted special 
attention. This subsidiary undertakes financial activities 
such as raising debt for the entire company group and 
investing this capital in a network of subsidiaries. One might 
expect Carlsberg to establish this type of wealth chain sub-
sidiary in a jurisdiction with greater tax and secrecy benefits. 
However, the investigation of Carlsberg Breweries finds that 
debt has been raised by issuing bonds at the Luxembourg 
stock exchange while being protected under British company 
law. This emphasizes how a MNC decenters its organization 
into advantageous jurisdictions not only by establishing sub-
sidiaries but also through contractual linkages with external 
partners. The tax and secrecy benefits cannot be observed 
exclusively by the location of the subsidiaries, as MNCs apply 
complex tools for existing outside the regulatory space of the 
nation state. In a governance perspective this underscores 
the regulatory ambiguity facing authorities when monitoring 
business transactions unilaterally.
A study of Carlsberg also shows that gains are being repat-
riated directly from producing entities located abroad into 
Denmark and the United Kingdom. Further research is 
required to clarify whether these repatriations are subject 
to tax payments in the United Kingdom and Denmark, or 
where those taxes are paid. Carlsberg controls, for example, 
an Uzbek brewery from the United Kingdom. Carlsberg may 
prefer paying the corporate income tax of 8% in Uzbekistan 
compared to 20% in the United Kingdom. Generally there is 
evidence that Carlsberg also establishes wealth chain sub-
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sidiaries in United Kingdom and Denmark. This emphasizes 
that the wealth chain is constituted by subsidiaries both in 
typical ‘offshore’ jurisdictions like Singapore, Hong Kong 
and Switzerland but also ‘onshore’ jurisdictions like Den-
mark and the United Kingdom. 
Interpretation of the investigation
One shared characteristic of these findings is that a 
researcher may look in vain for a ‘smoking gun’. Carlsberg 
does not engage in any criminal or illegal practices and eve-
rything takes place in compliance with current tax legisla-
tion. Instead we find evidence that Carlsberg by establishing 
subsidiaries in jurisdictions like Singapore, Hong Kong and 
Switzerland put themselves in a position where they are able 
to enjoy certain tax and secrecy benefits.
The case study also points towards the difficulty of distin-
guishing between offshore ‘tax havens’ and onshore jurisdic-
tions like Denmark and the United Kingdom. The offshore 
economy is not separated from the global economy, and 
Carlsberg controls subsidiaries in Hong Kong, Singapore 
and Switzerland only for the purpose of bringing protected 
wealth in these subsidiaries back into the balance sheet of 
the annual report. This is underlined by the fact that we find 
wealth chain subsidiaries in all types of jurisdictions and not 
only in Singapore, Hong Kong and Switzerland.
Carlsberg creates and protects wealth through a wealth chain 
which creates and protects pecuniary wealth by exploiting 
tax and secrecy benefits in ‘tax havens’, but parallel to this 
process, the wealth must also be accounted for in headquar-
ters of Carlsberg. As suggested by the Global Wealth Chains 
framework (Seabrooke and Wigan 2014b), the onshore-
offshore distinction that underpins the discourse about ‘tax 
havens’ is no longer useful when investigating firm behavior.
Consequently, to my liking, the ‘chain’ metaphor misleadingly 
captures how global wealth is being managed and control-
led by MNCs. Wealth chains indicate a linear flow of wealth, 
however, the reality shows that wealth is controlled in more 
complex and fluid networks.  This critique corresponds with 
how the global value chain framework developed into a glo-
bal production network as contemporary production neither 
follows a linear process. Following this global wealth net-
works should be a more adequate metaphor for describing 
how the contemporary MNC controls its financial activities.
This brief argues that the financial and legal decentering, 
which is observed by the method of distinguishing between 
subsidiaries, works as a catalyst for wealth creation and 
protection. This financial and legal decentering takes place 
in two layers. One layer of this decentering is observed by 
the location of the subsidiary illustrated by the subsidiar-
ies in Singapore, Hong Kong and Switzerland. Also, when a 
subsidiary located in Denmark issues bonds at the Luxem-
bourg stock exchange, this indicates that MNCs decenters 
and takes benefit of tax and secrecy advantages on a second 
and more opaque layer which breaks with the linear logic. 
MNCs may construct ‘pipelines’ for financial plumbing both 
above and underneath the regulatory surface. Regulatory 
authorities and this research can easily find that Carlsberg 
has established subsidiaries in Singapore, Hong Kong and 
Switzerland. We struggle to specify the purpose of transac-
tions. Neither are we able to study how internal trade may 
lead to transfer ‘mis’ pricing.
Conclusions
Carlsberg creates and protects pecuniary wealth by decenter-
ing into jurisdictions which offer certain tax and secrecy 
benefits. By studying the corporate structure of Carlsberg this 
brief finds that the financial and legal decentering of the firm 
unfolds on two layers. First, Carlsberg has established firm 
entities in typical ‘tax-havens’ with subsidiaries that only 
undertake financial activities and no production activities. 
This study also finds that similar subsidiaries are established 
in Denmark and the United Kingdom as Carlsberg is able to 
take advantage of secrecy and tax benefits through external 
partnerships which go beyond the location of the subsidiary. 
This is the second layer of their wealth chain. In a wider per-
spective, this brief indicates how the relationship between 
nation states and MNCs is evolving. Tax has historically been 
a contract between nation states and citizens including com-
panies but some MNCs are now able to dissolve this contract 
by decentering their organization worldwide.
Note
The data that has been collected about Carlsberg is made 
publicly available at http://tinyurl.com/CarlsbergGWC. 
Should be viewed by using Google docs.
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